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Abstract

Each year in the United States some four million children are reported to child
protective services and hundreds of thousands of children are conﬁrmed victims
of maltreatment. This chapter provides a brief overview of the civil and criminal
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law’s response to child abuse and neglect. It summarizes the major federal statutes
that provide funding to the states to support both civil and criminal law responses
to maltreatment. It discusses the division of responsible for responding to child
maltreatment between the federal and state governments (federalism). It also
provides a summary of the constitutional framework for handling both civil and
criminal child maltreatment cases.
Keywords

Abuse · Neglect · Maltreatment · Child maltreatment · Law · Child protection ·
Criminal law · Civil law · Federalism · Constitutional rights

Introduction
Each year in the United States, state child protection agencies receive approximately
4.0 million reports of suspected abuse or neglect. In Fiscal Year 2017, 3.5 million
children were the subject of formal child abuse and neglect investigations or
alternative responses to such investigations; after investigation, 674,000 children
were deemed victims of abuse or neglect and some 1720 children died from child
maltreatment (Administration on Children and Families 2019). These ofﬁcial numbers are widely believed to represent an undercount of the true numbers of children
who are maltreated (Myers 2006).
Broadly speaking, the law takes two approaches to responding to child abuse or
neglect. One is civil, which focuses primarily on cases involving abuse or neglect at
the hands of the child’s parent, guardian, or legal custodian. (Child maltreatment
may also be litigated in child custody proceedings or in personal injury actions;
space limitations preclude discussion of these in this chapter.) The other approach is
criminal, which may involve the child’s parent or another person responsible for
harming the child.

Overview: Two Systems Respond
The civil law provides a means of investigating alleged child maltreatment within the
child’s immediate family. In this context, “the child’s health and safety shall be the
paramount consideration” of the child protection system (42 U.S.C § 671(a)(15)(A)).
In the ﬁrst instance, even when a child has experienced maltreatment, these efforts
typically focus on preserving and strengthening the child’s family. Some argue that
the efforts to preserve families in which children have been maltreated are excessive,
placing children at unnecessary risk of further harm (Bartholet 1999; Gelles 1996).
When children are not safe in their home, the law provides that state juvenile and
family courts may remove children from parental custody and place them with a
relative or in foster care. Civil child protective proceedings are intended to protect
children from harm rather than to punish the parent (e.g., In re M.M. 2015). In People

The Law and Policy of Child Maltreatment

3

v. Moreno (2001), the Illinois Court of Appeals, in holding that the determination of
a child protective proceeding could not preclude a subsequent criminal prosecution
for the same underlying conduct, noted that “The differences of purpose and goal in
civil and criminal proceedings are ‘very real’” (p. 253). Similarly, the Vermont
Supreme Court has noted, “a criminal case seeks to identify any misconduct on
the part of the defendant” while a civil child protection case “seeks to identify how to
best protect the child, regardless of whether or not the child’s parent has engaged in
misconduct” (State v. Nutbrown-Covey 2017, p. 371). Punishment is reserved
exclusively for criminal proceedings.
While cases involving very serious forms of maltreatment may result in proceedings to immediately terminate a parent’s rights, in most cases, even after a
ﬁnding that a parent has maltreated, failed to provide for, or failed to protect a child,
the state must make “reasonable efforts” to maintain the child in the parental home
before the child may be removed. Similarly, after removal “reasonable efforts” are
typically required to address the problems that necessitated the removal and in order
to reunify the child with his or her caregivers before any alternative permanent
arrange for the child’s care in the form of adoption or permanent legal guardianship
may be pursued (Bartholet 1999).
In order to protect and provide care for children while their parents or caregivers
are working on a program of rehabilitation, each state operates, at substantial
expense, a program of substituted care. On September 30, 2017, there were nearly
443,000 children in the foster care system in the United States. During Fiscal year
2017, some 690,500 children spent some time in care. In the midst of the current
opioid epidemic, the number of children needing foster care placement has increased
in each of the ﬁve previous years for which numbers are available (Administration
on Children and Families 2019).
In addition to protecting children from harm and remediating the dysfunctions
within the family that caused the harm, the civil law provides an administrative
scheme that seeks to protect children from further harm by the identiﬁed perpetrator
of the maltreatment. To this end, each state maintains a registry of individuals found
to be responsible for maltreating a child. These registries are available to a limited
universe of persons – social service agencies, law enforcement, and employers
conducting background checks of individuals involved in certain professions (e.g.,
day care providers or teachers).
The criminal law provides a second legal mechanism to respond to child abuse
and neglect. Unlike civil proceedings, criminal actions seek to identify a speciﬁc
perpetrator of child maltreatment and to impose punishments for crimes including
child neglect, physical and sexual abuse, or sexual exploitation (e.g., producing or
distributing child pornography or trafﬁcking children). These crimes may be either
misdemeanors or felonies. Also unlike child protective proceedings, criminal proceedings may focus on members of the child’s immediate family, members of the
extended family (e.g., grandparents, cousins), other members of the child’s social
circle such as teachers, coaches or clergymen, or complete strangers.
Child maltreatment may violate laws exclusively enacted to protect children from
abuse or neglect or may violate general laws such as statutes prohibiting assaultive
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behavior or homicide offenses. In some circumstances, criminal proceedings may, in
addition to punishments, impose administrative burdens aimed at monitoring the
offender, sometimes for life. Sex offender registration is an example of this type of
regime (e.g., Smith v. Doe 2003).
This chapter will provide a summary of the primary ways that the civil and
criminal law respond to child abuse and neglect. The reader is cautioned that because
the vast majority of speciﬁc law relating to child maltreatment is enacted by the
individual states, there may be substantial variation in the law and how it is applied
to particular cases. The chapter turns next to a discussion of the civil law’s response
to child maltreatment, and it begins with a discussion of the constitutional authority
and limitations governing public efforts to protect children.

Civil Child Protection – Constitutional Framework
The Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land. Neither it nor
the Bill of Rights contain to words “child,” “parent” or “family.” For nearly a
century, though, the Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that the
Constitution protects the parent-child relationship. In doing so, the Court has struck a
balance between the interests of parents in guiding their children’s upbringing, the
rights of children in deriving the beneﬁt of parenting choices and freedom from
parental maltreatment, and the parens patriae interests of the state as the ultimate
guardian of the child to regulate or prohibit harmful parenting practices. Within this
framework, every state has enacted statutes aimed at responding to incidences of
child maltreatment at the hands of a parent.
The seminal case establishing the rights of parents to raise their children free of
undue governmental interference is Meyer v. Nebraska (1923). During World War I,
Nebraska enacted a law prohibiting the teaching of any modern language other than
English (ancient languages – Latin and Greek – were excepted from the law) or the
teaching of any subject in a modern foreign language to children who had not yet
passed the eighth grade. Robert Meyer, a parochial school teacher, was criminally
charged under the statute for teaching 10-year-old children in his classroom to read
in German. After his conviction, he appealed, arguing that the law violated his right
to liberty as provided for in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The
Court ruled in Meyer’s favor and overturned his conviction. The Court held that in
addition to one’s physical liberty, the Amendment protected “the right of the
individual . . . to engage in any of the common occupations of life.” This includes
the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men” (Meyer v. Nebraska, p. 399). Thus, the court recognized that
“it is the natural duty of the parents to give his children education suitable to their
station in life” (Meyer v. Nebraska 1923, p. 400). Since parents had this “natural
duty,” the Court reasoned, they had the right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
engage Mr. Meyer to educate their children in order to discharge their duty to their
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children. While the State may “go very far . . . in order to improve the quality of its
citizens,” the Court reasoned further, “the individual has certain fundamental rights
which must be respected” (Meyer 1923, p. 401).
Because Meyer involved the criminal prosecution of a teacher, it did not precisely
implicate a parents’ rights to guide their child’s upbringing. Two years after Meyer
was decided, in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary
(1925), the Court confronted a similar dispute that squarely addressed the rights of
parents to make parenting decisions for their children. Oregon law compelled every
child between the ages of 8 and 16 to attend a public school. The Society of Sisters,
which ran a catholic school, a military academy and a group of parents challenged
the law as violating the parents’ liberty interest in directing the educational upbringing of their children. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the parents, holding the
statute unconstitutional. In doing so, the Court noted that, “The child is not a mere
creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations”
(Pierce v. Society of Sisters, p. 535).
Together Meyer and Pierce established the principle that parents have a fundamental right to guide their children’s upbringing. At the same time, the Court
intimated that the state retained considerable power to regulate education and,
more broadly, was not without power to regulate a number of childrearing practices.
Prince v. Massachusetts (1944) addressed the limitations on parental decisionmaking authority regarding a child. That case involved the application of the state’s
law regulating child labor. A statute prohibited children of certain ages from
engaging in certain activities. Sarah Prince permitted her two children and another
child whom she served as legal guardian to sell religious pamphlets on the streets of
for $.05, which resulted in her being criminally charged with violating the state’s
child labor laws.
The case raised two issues before the Supreme Court. First, it addressed the right
of a parent to direct her child’s religious development. The second issue was the right
of the child to participate in his or her family’s religious practices. In Prince, the
Court articulated the two parties’ competing interests in child rearing – the interest of
parents to raise their children without governmental interference and the right of
State authorities to protect a child’s welfare. “It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care, and nurture of the child reside ﬁrst with the parents.” The Court went on to
make clear, however, that “the family is not beyond regulation in the public interest”
(p. 167). Indeed, “neither the rights of religion nor the rights of parenthood are
beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well-being, the
state . . . may restrict the parent’s control” (p. 166) in numerous ways, including
through compulsory education laws and laws prohibiting child labor. The Court was
clear that “the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting child welfare” (Prince v. Massachusetts 1944, p. 167).
Years later, in a case that adjudicated the rights of Amish parents to discontinue their
children’s formal education after age 13 in the face of a state statute that required that
children remain in school until they were 16, the Court summarized the relationship
of parent and state. American history and culture, the Court said, “reﬂect a strong
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tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.” It
continued, “This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is
now established beyond debate.” The Court, however, made clear that “the power of
the parent . . . may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for
signiﬁcant social burdens” (Wisconsin v. Yoder 1972, pp. 233–234). Thus, either
harm to the child and the burdening of the public may legitimately trigger state
intervention into family life. Child maltreatment implicates both of these legitimate
governmental concerns.
The rights of child in this tripartite analysis are somewhat less well-deﬁned.
Generally in the child protection context, children’s rights correspond to their
parents’ rights. In Duchesne v. Sugarman (1977), the Court described the relationship this way: The “right to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the
reciprocal rights of both parent and children. It is the interest of the parent in the
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children . . . and of the
children in not being dislocated from the ‘emotional attachments that derive from the
intimacy of daily association,’ with the parent” (p. 825).
The state’s interest in a child’s welfare is at its zenith in the child protection
context, where the state possesses an “urgent interest in the welfare of the child”
(Lassiter v. Department of Social Services 1981, p. 27). Because of the importance of
the state’s interest, Courts have made clear there is no constitutional right to remain
together as a family (e.g., Anh v. Levi 1978). Thus, a juvenile or family court may
order a child removed from his or her parent’s custody in order to protect the child
from maltreatment. The Supreme Court has suggested, without yet squarely holding,
that the reciprocity of the parent-child relationship precludes state authorities from
assuming at the adjudication phase of a child protection case that the parent and the
child are adversaries. Only after the state has demonstrated parental unﬁtness (i.e.,
that the parent is in some way abusive or neglectful) may governmental authorities
assume that the interests of the parent and the child diverge (Santosky v. Kramer
1982).
In the course of adjudicating the rights of parents and children in the child
protection context, the law requires fundamentally fair procedures. This includes
written notice of the allegations against the parent, the opportunity to be heard, and
the right to have a neutral decision-maker (judge or jury) determine the facts of the
case. There is no absolute constitutional right for a parent to be provided a lawyer at
public expense if the parent cannot afford to hire legal counsel (Lassiter v. Department of Social Services 1981), though most states, either as a matter of state
constitutional law or by statute, provide a lawyer at public expense for indigent
parents. When the State seeks to terminate a parent’s parental rights, it must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that there is a legally justiﬁable reason to do so
(Santosky v. Kramer 1982). If a parent whose rights have been terminated by a
trial court wishes to appeal, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to have a transcript of the trial court
proceedings provided to the parent at public expense (M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 1996).
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Federalism – The Role of States in Child Protection
Beyond the basic procedural framework of liberty, due process, and equal protection
required by the Constitution, “The whole subject of domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States, and not to the laws of the
United States” (In re Burrus 1890). Thus, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., the authority) to consider collateral attacks on a state court’s decision to
terminate a parent’s parental rights and the federal right of habeas corpus is not
available in this context (Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services Agency
1982). The rationale for this division of authority between the federal government
and the individual states – i.e., federalism – is that “a healthy balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front” (Gregory v. Ashcroft 1991, p. 458).
Federalism, then, reserves the substantive law of child protection to each individual state as part of each state’s general family law. Each state may deﬁne for itself
what constitutes a “child,” what constitutes “child abuse,” what constitutes “child
neglect,” and the procedures by which child protection cases will be proceed through
the state court system (e.g., In the Interest of L.J.B. 2018; New Jersey Division of
Child Protection and Permanency v. Y.N. 2014). To illustrate, in In the Interests of L.
J.B (2018), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a mother’s use of illicit drugs
during her pregnancy could not form the basis for the juvenile court to assume
authority over a newborn baby. Under Pennsylvania law, the parties agreed that a
fetus was not a “child” within the meaning of the child protection law. Because the
fetus was not a “child” the mother could not properly be found to be a perpetrator of
child abuse. Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that where a woman who
was addicted to heroin became pregnant and, upon learning she was pregnant,
entered a methadone treatment program then gave birth to a baby who experienced
withdrawal because of the methadone dependence, the juvenile court could not take
jurisdiction of the baby immediately upon birth. In the Court’s view, the mother’s use
of methadone under a doctor’s care and as part of legitimate treatment program alone
did not constitution neglect within the meaning of the state’s law. The court held,
however, that if there were other neglectful acts by the mother (e.g., ongoing illicit
drug use, inability to provide for the baby), that could be considered neglect (New
Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. Y.N. 2014). By comparison, a
number of state appellate courts have ruled that substance abuse during pregnancy
itself is sufﬁcient to courts child protective authority immediately upon the child’s
birth (e.g., In re Baby X 1980; In re Troy D. 1989). In the seminal case in this line, the
appellate court noted that, “a child has a right to begin life with sound mind and
body” (In re Baby X 1980, p. 115).
There is one exception to the general rule that child protection is left to the
individual states. That exception is embodied in the Indian Child Welfare Act (1978)
(ICWA), which was enacted in 1978. The Constitution of the United States provides
that relations with Indian Tribes are to be governed by the federal government
through the so-called Indian Commerce Clause rather than by the individual states
(Const. U.S., Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 3). The ICWA came about as a result of a long history
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of efforts to assimilate Indian children into the dominant white culture through
abusive child welfare practices, which resulted in as many as one-third of all Indian
children being removed from their parents’ custody for placement in foster or
adoptive homes. Those substitute care providers were predominantly white. Additionally, Indian children historically and culturally were raised as part of a tribe or
band in which a more communal childrearing ethic was operative. The same
practices that led to the excessive removal of children from their parents disregarded
the role of the tribe in the child’s life. The ICWA addressed these concerns by
mandating that when state child protection authorities seek to remove an “Indian
child” from his or her home. By its terms, the statute applied only to an “Indian
child,” which it deﬁnes as an unmarried person under 18 who is a member of a tribe
or is eligible for membership in a tribe and is the biological child of a member of a
tribe (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)). Because of this deﬁnition, the ICWA may not apply to
all children who identify as Native American and may apply to one member of a
sibling group and not another. Each tribe deﬁnes for itself its membership. When
handling a case involving an “Indian child,” state courts must comply with a series of
procedural requirements that are speciﬁcally intended to make removal of the child
from parental custody more difﬁcult. In part because the statute makes removal more
difﬁcult, it has been controversial since its enactment. Among the ICWA’s procedural requirements are higher standards of evidence for initial removal and termination of parental rights, a requirement that “active efforts” be made ﬁrst to prevent
the child’s removal from the parent’s custody then to try to address the problems that
made removal necessary and reunify the child with the parent. The law also requires
expert testimony by at least one individual knowledge in tribal child rearing practice
(Fletcher et al. 2009).

The Role of Federal Statutes
Because state law governs the substance of parent-child relations except in the
context of Indian children, the primary way in which the federal government
inﬂuences the handling of child protection cases is through its power to expend
money. The Constitution’s spending clause permits the federal government to spend
money to support state policies it wishes to see implemented, and to withhold money
when a state’s policies do not comply with federal priorities or prerogatives. Basically, through funding statutes, the federal government establishes a source of
ﬁnancial support that the individual states and Indian tribes can access contingent
on their implementation of the various requirements of the relevant federal statute.
Unless otherwise explicitly provided for in these funding statutes, the Supreme
Court has held, such laws do not create an individual right that is enforceable by
particular persons. Thus, for example, in Suter v. Artist M. (1992), the Court held that
an individual could not bring suit under the federal civil rights law alleging a
violation of the “reasonable efforts” requirement contained in Title IV-E, which
funded foster care services. This principle has been codiﬁed in some portions of the
law, for example, Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, which funds some child
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welfare services, explicitly states that it does not “entitle any individual or family to
assistance under any State program funded under this part” (42 U.S.C.§ 601(b)). By
contrast, the Multiethnic Placement Act as amended by the Interethnic Placement
Provisions explicitly grants the right to sue to any person who is aggrieved as a result
of its violation (42 U.S.C. 674(d)(3)).
What follows is a brief summary of the major federal legislation addressing child
maltreatment and foster care.

Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
Before the mid-1970s, the federal government played little role in child protection
(Myers 2006). With the enactment of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
in 1974 (CAPTA), Congress began to provide funding to the individual states in an
effort to prevent child maltreatment and to support states’ efforts to protect children
from parental abuse and neglect. A state’s access to those funds is contingent on the
state complying with the statute’s various, speciﬁc requirements. These include such
things as a program of mandated reporting of suspected child abuse or neglect,
immunity for those mandated reporters, a requirement that children’s protective
services (CPS) agencies investigate cases of human trafﬁcking involving children
and that cases of children born after being prenatally exposed to alcohol or illicit
drugs be reported to CPS. CAPTA has been renewed and amended numerous times
since it was initially enacted. With each renewal, the list of speciﬁc requirements
with which states must comply grows more detailed (Children Bureau 2019).
In addition to funding state programs aimed at preventing and responding to child
maltreatment, CAPTA established a program to conduct research as to the causes
and consequences of child abuse and neglect. This program, in part, seeks to identify
best practices and then to promote their adoption in communities across the country.

Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
Also in the mid-1970s, Congress took up issues related to the foster care system. In
1959, Mass and Engler published a major study that found that children who entered
the foster care system very often stayed for years (Maas and Engler 1959). Far too
often, there was no plan nor any effort either to return these children to their
biological family or to sever permanently parental rights making them available
for adoption into a new family. Children moved frequently, from one family to
another or into institutional settings. Large numbers of children left foster care
through aging out. These elements of “foster care drift” and “limbo” persisted into
the 1970s (Fanshel and Shinn 1978). Two cases decided by the US Supreme Court in
that era illustrate these problems. First, in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equality & Reform (1977) a group of foster parents sued New York City’s (NYC)
child welfare agency seeking court orders that the agency’s procedures for removing
children from their homes violated their right to due process of law. The Court ruled
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against the foster parents. In doing so, it noted that a foster child in NYC spent an
average of 4 years in the system, and that some of the children at issue in the case had
been with their foster families for 10 years. The second case, Santosky v. Kramer
(1982), also from New York, involved three children. The ﬁrst entered foster care in
November 1973, the other two in September 1974. In September of 1976, the agency
sought to terminate the parents’ rights to the children. The trial court denied this
request and continued the children in temporary foster care. Two years later, in
October 1978, the agency again petitioned to terminate parental rights, which the
trial court granted. The parents appealed, and the Supreme Court decided the case in
1982, reversing the state courts’ decision to terminate the parents’ rights and sent the
case back to the state trial court for further proceedings.
Congress’s response to foster care “drift” and “limbo” was to pass the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA). Broadly speaking, the
AACWA had three goals. First, it sought to reduce the number of children entering
the foster care system by mandating, as a contingency to taking federal money, that
states make “reasonable efforts” to reduce the placement of children into out-ofhome care. Next, the statute sought to ensure that foster care was temporary and to
shorten the time children spend in foster care. It accomplished this by mandating
“reasonable efforts” be made to return children to their families. It also mandated that
a permanency planning hearing (PPH) 18 months after the child entered foster care.
The PPH’s purpose was to force a decision to return the child to his or her biological
parents or to move to terminate parental rights so that the child could be adopted.
Finally, to move children out of the foster care system, the law established a program
of adoption assistance that provides ﬁnancial support in the form of cash stipends
and Medicaid support for adoptive families while requiring that states again undertake “reasonable efforts” to ﬁnalize an adoption plan for the child.
To carry out the mandates of the AACWA, Congress created two new titles within
the Social Security Act (the Act). Title IV-B of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 621, et sec.)
funds family preservation services for families involved with CPS. Its goals are:
1. Protecting and promoting the welfare of all children
2. Preventing the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children
3. Supporting at-risk families through services which allow children, where appropriate, to remain safely with their families or return to their families in a timely
manner
4. Promoting the safety, permanence, and well-being of children in foster care and
adoptive families
5. Providing training, professional development and support to ensure a well-qualiﬁed child welfare workforce
The AACWA also added Title IV-E to the Act, which established a stream of
funding to support foster care for children in need of those services, family
reuniﬁcation services while children were in foster care and the adoption assistance
program.
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Multiethnic Placement Act and the Interethnic Placement Provisions
Historically, children of color were denied access to many child welfare services
(Vandervort 2016). More recently, there has been concern about the overrepresentation of children of color in the child protection system (e.g., McRoy 2005). Related
to this issue has been a long and sometimes contentious debate about cross-racial
adoption (Kennedy 2003; Bartholet 1999). Children of color, particularly African
American children, have represented a group of special concern in relation to foster
care. These children tend to spend more time in foster care and spend more time
awaiting adoptive families (Myers 2006). This was, in part, due to race matching
policies, which required efforts to match children in need of foster care or adoption
with families of the same race. Foster care services are often provided through
private, sectarian foster care agencies. For example, for many years children entering
New York City’s (NYC) foster care system were provided homes through religiously
afﬁliated foster care organizations that matched their family’s religion. Jewish
children, for example, were placed through Jewish foster care programs while
children from Catholic families through Catholic agencies. Black children tended
to be Protestant and were placed through Protestant agencies, which lacked sufﬁcient
resources to meet the demand. The American Civil Liberties Union’s Children’s
Rights Project brought suit on behalf of black Protestant children against NYC
seeking to end the practice of religious matching in placement. The parties reached
a settlement that required children to be placed on a ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served basis,
which the Federal District Court approved. The sectarian agencies appealed to the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which upheld the agreement
against religion-based First Amendment claims (Wilder v. Bernstein 1988).
To address the problem of delay in foster care and adoptive placement to
accommodate race-matching practices, Congress, in 1994, passed and the President
signed into law the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA). It amended Title IV-E with
the intent of eliminating the “routine” consideration of race, color, or national origin
in foster care and adoptive placement (Mutiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) 1994).
The prohibition on “routine” race matching, however, proved easy to circumvent.
So, 2 years later, Congress passed the Interethnic Adoption Provisions, which barred
outright the consideration of race, color, or national origin in making placement
decisions except in very narrow, case speciﬁc, circumstances.
MEPA-IEP took several other steps to eliminate race-matching practices. First, it
imposed signiﬁcant ﬁnancial penalties on states for its violation. Next, it required
that states put in place policies to recruit foster and adoptive homes that would meet
the needs of children entering the system, which responded to the historical denial of
persons of color from fostering and adopting, either by explicit prohibition or by the
implementation of race-neutral policies that disproportionately impacted applicants
of color. The statute, as noted earlier, explicitly granted any person, adult or child,
aggrieved by its violation an individual right to sue (Vandervort 2016).
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Adoption and Safe Families Act
Shortly after the enactment of the AACWA, the United States began to experience an
epidemic of crack cocaine use, which had many of the characteristics of the opioid
epidemic in full swing at this time of this writing. That earlier epidemic hit the child
protection system hard and frustrated the intent of the AACWA to reduce the
numbers of children entering the foster care system and to shorten children’s time
in care. Despite the ravages of crack cocaine, child protection agencies overemphasized family preservation to the detriment of children (Gelles 1996; Bartholet
1999). A series of high-proﬁle cases in which children were murdered or maimed by
parents after repeated instances in which violent families were preserved or children
reuniﬁed with parents who had presumably been successfully rehabilitated were
featured in the nation’s mass media (e.g., Terry 1996; Hentoff 1988). For example,
the beating death of Eli Creekmore, a 3-year-old from Washington State (Hentoff
1988), which was the subject of numerous local and national stories in the print
media as well as a documentary on Public Broadcasting, and David Edwards, the
child at the center of Richard J. Gelles’s 1996 The Book of David (Gelles 1996).
Joshua DeShaney was another such child whose case made its way to the Supreme
Court. CPS workers were aware that Joshua’s father was physically abusing him.
Despite that knowledge, they took no action to remove him from his home and made
no meaningful efforts to protect him while he remained in his father’s custody. After
the father beat Joshua causing serious brain injuries that left him in a coma and
permanently brain damaged, Joshua’s mother sued CPS on behalf of her son,
claiming that CPS’s inaction violated Joshua’s civil rights. The Supreme Court
ultimately dismissed the suit, ruling that the child had no right to protection from
the state’s child protection apparatus (DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services 1989).
By 1997, Congress grew concerned that its intention in requiring “reasonable
efforts” to preserve and to reunify families had been misconstrued by federal
bureaucrats and state child protection agencies. To clarify its intent, Congress passed
the Adoption and Safe Families Act (1997) (ASFA), which amended Titles IV-B and
IV-E. While it retained the “reasonable efforts” requirement and provided more
funding for family preservation programming, the amendments made clear that the
child’s safety was to be the paramount consideration of child welfare agencies. For
the ﬁrst time it deﬁned a narrow group of egregious cases of maltreatment in which
state child welfare agencies would be required to immediately seek termination of
parental rights. That is, a group of cases where any efforts to preserve or reunify the
child with the parent would be considered per se unreasonable.
Next, ASFA permitted states to deﬁne additional “aggravated circumstances”
cases in which the state could elect to forgo family preservation or reuniﬁcation
efforts and move immediately to terminate parental rights. In response, California,
for example, enacted a statute that deﬁnes 17 speciﬁc circumstances when
reuniﬁcation services are unnecessary. These range from cases of severe physical
abuse to situations in which the parents participate in chronic substance abuse
(California Welfare & Institutions Code § 361.5(b)).
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ASFA also gave state agency personnel the authority to override the “reasonable
efforts” requirements in any case in which seeking to reunify a child with a parent is
not reasonable. In response, some states enacted statutes to do so. For example,
Illinois enacted a statute that permits the state’s child protection agency to seek
immediate termination of parental rights “in those extreme cases in which the
parent’s incapacity to care for the child, combined with an extremely poor prognosis
for treatment or rehabilitation, justiﬁes expedited termination of parental rights” (705
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann § 405/1-2(1)(c)). In addition, the amendments permitted a state
trial court to make any decision in an individual case that would meet the needs of
the child without threatening federal funding (42 U.S.C. § 678).
In addition to these major revisions, ASFA included numerous additional and
procedural requirements to redouble the child protection system’s efforts to move
children more quickly through the foster care system, to make it truly temporary
(Vandervort 2016). Many of ASFA’s goals were undermined by the very agency, the
Children’s Bureau, charged with their implementation. Almost from the moment of
its enactment, federal bureaucrats sought to render ASFA ineffective in order to
maintain the focus on family preservation and reuniﬁcation. Two years after its
enactment, Harvard Law School Professor Elizabeth Bartholet wrote regarding
ASFA, “The child welfare establishment is hard at work today pushing for the
development of new programs and the expansion of old ones that are consistent
with the family preservation tradition” (Bartholet 1999, p. 28). Despite ASFA’s clear
mandate that child safety was to guide child protection work, two decades after its
enactment, the child’s parents were still considered by CPS agencies and caseworkers as the primary focus of child protection services (Dwyer 2016; Gelles
2016).
After ASFA’s enactment, a new child welfare program, called differential
response (DR) or alternative response (AR), was widely adopted despite a lack of
any real empirical support for its effectiveness (Hughes et al. 2013; Gelles 2016).
This program is another in a long line of programs that seek to preserve families at
the risk of serious harm to children. DR/AR forgoes an investigation relying instead
on an allegedly more compassionate “family engagement” approach in an effort to
address problems of child maltreatment. The program’s goal is to divert “a large
percentage of the cases that traditionally are under child protective services jurisdiction to a new voluntary . . . track” (Gelles 2016, p. 752).

Family First Prevention Services Act
The Family First Prevention Services Act (FFPSA) was signed into law in February
2018. At this writing, the statute is in the process of implementation, with most of its
various provisions due to be in effect in late 2019 and 2020. As the name of the
statute suggests, this statute is a reversion back to the aggressive family preservation
program in the 1980s and 1990s. Although DR/AR programs have been heavily
criticized as lacking a solid empirical base (Bartholet 2015; Hughes et al. 2013), the
FFPSA seems to adopt them as a primary means of doing the business of child
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protection (Administration for Children and Families 2018). In doing so, the new
focus seems to suggest that the problem of child protection is placement in foster
care rather than the harms that result from parental abuse and neglect, and to see
poverty rather than adult dysfunction as the primary cause of child maltreatment.
While poverty contributes to child maltreatment, the vast majority impoverished
parents do not maltreat their children and never come into contact with CPS.
Focusing on poverty also begs the question of what drives the poverty these families
experience. The highly dysfunctional parents entangled in the child protection
system are very often poor because they abuse drugs, suffer from mental health
problems that they cannot or will not address, live in violent relationships, and so on.
Most parents involved with the child protection system suffer from several of these
dysfunctions at one time, and this comorbidity drives them ever deeper into the child
protection system and make providing rehabilitative treatment more difﬁcult. These
parents are not in the system because they are poor. They are poor because they have
a multiplicity of functional problems that impair their capacity to safely parent their
children (Gelles 2016).
The FFPSA requires that therapeutic services provided to children must be
trauma-informed and evidence-based. The statute provides three levels of evidence-based services – promising, supported, or well-supported. The Children’s
Bureau will establish a vetting procedure to ensure that services are evidencebased 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)).
Time will tell how the FFPSA will be implemented and what impact it will have.
The initial policy guidance from the Children’s Bureau is not encouraging and, given
our previous experience with aggressive family preservation services, suggests that
children will be placed at increasing risk of serious harm. When the civil law’s child
protection system fails to protect children from maltreatment, the criminal law often
takes over. That was the case with Joshua DeShaney’s father. He was convicted of
criminal child abuse and spent 2 years in prison, though his son, who suffered until
his death as a result of the abuse he experienced (Stephenson 2015).

Criminal Law’s Response to Child Maltreatment
Whereas the civil law’s response to child maltreatment focuses primarily on child
abuse or neglect within the family, the criminal law’s response is broader. It
implicates both those adults who are legally responsible for a child’s care (e.g.,
parents, guardians) and those who are not, including those who may have no
acquaintance with the child at all. Unlike the civil context discussed above, criminal
proceedings alleging child maltreatment seek to identify a speciﬁc perpetrator of the
abuse or neglect and to impose punishments commensurate with the harm caused.
Criminal charges involving child maltreatment may involve either adults or juveniles. While juvenile proceedings may technically be civil, they require most of the
same procedural protections required of adult criminal prosecution (In re Gault
1967). Juveniles charged with more serious offenses may be tried as an adult. For
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example, in one high-proﬁle case, a 12-year-old boy was charged and convicted as
an adult with murder in the beating death of a 6-year-old (e.g., State v. Tate 2003).

Criminal Prosecution of Child Maltreatment – Constitutional
Framework
As discussed in the civil context, the Constitution envisions a limited role for the
federal government, leaving most of the substantive criminal law to the individual
states (Brecht v. Abrahamson 1993). This principle of federalism means that only
where the prohibited conduct “substantially affects” interstate commerce may Congress impose criminal sanctions (United States v. Lopez 1995, p. 559). In United
States v. Nagarwala (2018), the federal prosecutor charged several medical professionals and four mothers with violating the federal statute prohibiting female
genital mutilation (FGM), with conspiracy to violate the FGM statue and with aiding
and abetting FGM after the mothers brought their young daughters to doctors to have
the procedure performed. The defendants asked the court to dismiss the charges on
the grounds that Congress lacked the authority to enact a law prohibiting FGM
because it did not substantially affect interstate commerce. The court agreed, found
the FGM statute unconstitutional, and dismissed the charges. It is for the states, not
the federal government, to regulate this intrastate conduct, the court ruled.
Conversely, when criminal conduct implicates interstate commerce, it is a proper
subject for Congress and the federal government to regulate and punish. Thus, for
example, a statute making it a federal criminal offense to knowingly possess or
distribute child pornography was held to be a proper exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. This is because, although much child pornography is
“homegrown,” it often “enters the national market surreptitiously” and “Congress,
in an attempt to halt interstate trafﬁcking, can prohibit local production that feeds the
national market and stimulates demand, as this production substantially affects
interstate commerce” (United States v. Holston 2003, pp. 89–90).

Prosecutorial Discretion
When a law has been properly enacted, the principle of separation of powers
between the three branches of government – the legislative, the executive, and the
judicial – gives the prosecutor, an executive branch ofﬁcial – broad discretion in
determining whether to charge a person with a crime and what charges to bring (e.g.,
Brodenkircher v. Hayes 1978). Thus, charges for an act of child maltreatment may be
brought under statutes enacted speciﬁcally to address child abuse or neglect, or they
may be brought under more general statutes such as those that punish assaults or
homicides. Many states have structured their criminal sexual conduct statutes so that
the sexual assault of a child requires the same factual proof as sexual assault of an
adult victim, but increase the penalties when the victim is a child.
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Constitutional Protections for Defendants
The protections contained in the Bill of Rights, applicable to the individual states
through the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment itself apply to criminal proceedings. When the state seeks to punish an
individual citizen for a violation of the criminal law, which may include loss of
physical liberty through incarceration, the protections afforded by the constitution
are at their strongest. For purposes of this chapter, the discussion will be limited to
the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eight Amendments, which have particular salience in a
child abuse or neglect prosecutions. But the reader should be aware that others also
apply.

First Amendment
The First Amendment protects the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press.
In Globe Newspaper Company v. Superior Court (1982), the Supreme Court
addressed a case from Massachusetts involving a statute that required a trial court
to close the courtroom to the public during the trial of certain sex crimes against
minors. A defendant was charged with sexually assaulting three minors. As required
by the statute, the state trial court ordered the courtroom closed to the press and the
public. The Globe Newspapers appealed the order closing the courtroom. The
Supreme Court found that the press’s access to the courtroom is not an absolute
right. Access may be restricted when other competing considerations outweigh the
rights of the press and the public. To restrict access, however, 1) the government
must articulate a compelling reason for closing the courtroom; and 2) the closing of
the courtroom must be narrowly tailored to meet that compelling reason. The Court
ruled that neither the government’s interest in protecting the child-witnesses from
trauma and embarrassment nor its interest in encouraging victims to come forward
justiﬁed the trial court’s action in this case. While the protection of child witnesses is
a compelling governmental interest, the law went too far in presuming that every
child would be traumatized by testifying in public. Instead, the Court required that a
case-by-case determination of harm to the particular child who was to testify and that
alternatives to closing the courtroom be considered. As for encouraging victims to
come forward, the Court found this rationale dubious.
The Fifth Amendment
Relevant to this discussion, the Fifth Amendment provides that a person “shall not be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” (Cons’t. U.S.,
Amend. 5). That is, a person has a right to remain silent when questioned by a
police ofﬁcer or other governmental representative about his or her involvement in a
criminal act (e.g., Miranda v. Arizona 1966). The right to remain silent also applies at
trial (Grifﬁn v. California 1965). A parent’s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination is not violated when the court orders the parent to either produce or
disclose the whereabouts of a child who has been placed in his or her custody by the
court in a child protection proceeding subject to certain monitoring requirements
(Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight 1990).
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The Sixth Amendment
Among other things, the Sixth Amendment guarantees that a criminal defendant is
entitled to confront the witnesses called by the prosecution. The Supreme Court has
decided several cases involving child abuse-related charges with Sixth Amendment
implications.
In Crawford v. Washington (2004), the Supreme Court held that a witness’s
testimonial statements could not be admitted against a criminal defendant without
the declarant of those statements being present in court and available for crossexamination by the defendant or his lawyer. Crawford involved a case of domestic
violence, which resulted in criminal charges for assault and attempted murder. After
the police were called to the scene the victim, the defendant’s wife, was interviewed
by ofﬁcers. The ofﬁcers took her statements in their report. At trial, she did not take
the stand because the state’s marital privilege law prohibited her from testifying
against her husband. At trial, the court allowed the prosecution to admit her
statements to the police. After the defendant was convicted, he appealed. The
Court ruled that admitting testimonial statements – those made under circumstances
that the person making the statement knows or should know that they will be used in
court – violated the defendant’s confrontation rights and required that the witness
appear at trial and submit to cross-examination. For the purposes of this chapter, the
general rule that emerged from Crawford is that children must testify when they are
the alleged victims of criminal child abuse and they must submit to cross-examination. Once the child testiﬁes his or her out-of-court statements made admissible
under the hearsay rules may be admitted for a proper purpose (Vandervort 2013).
In Ohio v. Clark (2015), a 3-year-old boy arrived at his preschool with injuries
and bruises to his eye and the side of his head. When the teacher and the principal
asked what happened, the child indicated that his mother’s paramour had hit him.
Prosecutors charged the paramour with child abuse-related offenses. At trial, the
prosecution offered the child’s hearsay statements to the teacher and principal in lieu
of calling the boy as a witness. After he was convicted, the defendant appealed.
Applying the rule from Crawford, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that this
process violated the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him. The State
appealed to the Supreme Court, which revered and reinstated Mr. Clark’s conviction.
In doing so, it ruled that the child’s statements to the school ofﬁcials were not
“testimonial,” that is, they were not made for the primary purpose of supporting a
criminal prosecution.
In another case, the Supreme Court had to decide whether witness protections for
child witnesses (e.g., closed circuit television) utilized in some jurisdictions violate a
criminal defendant’s confrontation right. In Maryland v. Craig (1990), the trial court
made speciﬁc ﬁndings that the child would be harmed or rendered unable to testify
fully by a direct, face-to-face confrontation with the defendant in the course of a
child sexual abuse prosecution. The Court held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is not absolute. The state’s interest in
protecting child witnesses and permitting them to testify fully is an important one.
So, the Court held, where the trial court makes ﬁndings regarding the speciﬁc case
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that testifying in a direct confrontation with the defendant would inﬂict trauma that is
more than de minimus or would render the child-witness unable to testify, the use of
child witness protections is justiﬁed.
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987), the Court addressed an issue related to the
confrontation right. In that case, the defendant was charged with sexually abusing his
daughter. CPS had conducted an investigation. The defendant subpoenaed CPS’s
records. The agency refused to turn the record over, asserting that it was privileged.
Defendant sought a court order for the records, which he claimed he needed to have
access to in order to conduct an effective cross-examination of the daughter. The trial
court denied him any access to the records. After he was convicted, Ritchie appealed.
The state appellate court overturned the conviction ruling that the denial of access to
the entire CPS record violated his confrontation right. The state appealed. The US
Supreme Court held that Ritchie was not entitled to unrestricted access to the CPS
ﬁle. Rather, the defendant had a right to have the trial court judge conduct a review of
the CPS records and for the judge to determine whether there was any information in
the CPS record that might have led to an acquittal. If the CPS record contained such
information, it must be turned over to the defendant and he was entitled to a new
trial. If the CPS record did not contain such information, Ritchie’s conviction was
afﬁrmed.

The Eighth Amendment
The Eight Amendment prohibits the imposition of “cruel and unusual punishment”
(Cons’t. U.S., Amend. 8). In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that the Eight Amendment was violated by a Louisiana law that allowed one who rapes a child to be
sentenced to death (Kennedy v. Louisiana 2008). The death penalty is available, the
Court ruled, only in cases involving homicide.

Victim’s Rights
While neither the Federal Constitution nor the Bill of Rights addresses the rights of
crime victims. Both Congress and the states have addressed the rights of crime
victims, including victims of child maltreatment offenses. The states have incorporated victim’s rights into either their state constitutions or through legislative enactment, or both. Wisconsin enacted the ﬁrst crime victim’s rights statue in 1980. By the
1990s, every state had addressed the rights of crime victims either by amending their
state constitution or by enacting legislation (National Institute of Justice 1998).

Federal Funding
As with civil child protective proceedings, the federalism issues that prohibit the
federal government from enacting general criminal laws do not prevent Congress
from using its spending power to inﬂuence state responses to crime by providing
ﬁnancial incentives to enact laws that Congress supports. For example, the Jacob
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Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act
(Wetterling Act), which is part of a broader crime control act, the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, provides funding incentives to the states
to create sex offender registries for offenders who commit sexually violent offenses
or commit various crimes against child-victims.
In part in response to the Wetterling Act, states enacted sex offender registration
laws, which have been challenged on a number of grounds. Alaska’s registration law,
which applied retroactively to previously adjudicated offenders, was challenged as
the imposition of a retroactive punishment in violation the Constitution’s Ex Post
Facto clause in Smith v. Doe (2003). The Supreme Court rejected this challenge. It
held that when enacting the registration law, the state legislature’s intent was not to
punish. Rather, its intent was to establish a civil regime of monitoring sex offenders.
Similarly, the Court rejected a challenge to Connecticut’s sex offender registration
law. That law required information about sex offenders to be available to the public
on the Internet, which, it was argued, violated the registrant’s right to due process
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment (Connecticut Department of Public Safety
v. Doe 2003). At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court has before it another sex
offender registry case, Gundy v. United States (2018), which challenges the federal
Sex Offender Registration and Notiﬁcation Act’s delegation of rule-making authority to the Attorney General of the United States. Gundy, who was convicted of failing
to register as required by the law when he moved from Pennsylvania to New York, is
challenging the rules issued by the Attorney General as a violation of the separation
of powers, that is, that the rules make new law rather than merely implement the
properly enacted law.

Key Points
• The law provides two basic responses to child maltreatment, a civil response and
a criminal response. The civil response may involve child protection cases
typically brought by state child protection authorities, child custody actions
initiated by the child’s parent, or personal injury actions to seek monetary
compensation for injuries to the child. Criminal proceedings seek to identify the
perpetrator of child maltreatment and to impose punishment and rehabilitative
services on him or her.
• Both civil proceedings and criminal proceedings implicate the constitutional
rights of the parties. Civil proceedings implicate the rights of the child, the child’s
parents, and the state. Criminal proceedings implicate the rights of the defendant
and the state. Additionally, criminal proceedings implicate statutory – thought not
constitutional – rights of the victim.
• Substantive child maltreatment law is primarily established by the individual
states. As a matter of federalism, the constitutionally constructed relationship
between state governments and the federal government, individual states determine the substance of the law relating to child maltreatment (e.g., how “child
abuse” is deﬁned).
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• The federal government inﬂuences state law through a series of funding statutes
that provide federal ﬁnancial support to a state if the state’s program and procedures comply with federal law’s requirements. Through this funding process,
the federal government has come to play a critical role in how individual states
handle cases of child maltreatment.

Conclusion
As this summary demonstrates, most law responding to child maltreatment is state
law that operates within a federal framework consisting of constitutional requirements. Congress drives states’ child abuse and neglect policies by providing funding
to support policy choices Congress wishes to see implemented.
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